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Special Issue Introduction:  
The Time for Nihilism—Philosophy, Metaphysics and Education 
Nick Peim 
University of Birmingham, UK 
 
Fundamental Nothing 
Ontological analysis of knowledge in education might begin by distinguishing 
between knowledge and the determining force that defines knowledge as significant 
or otherwise. Under the pressure of this division “knowledge itself” eludes any 
grasp. And without the ballast of a determinant knowledge, what becomes of 
education—except to be a technology of the self? 
Fundamental conditions of possibility for knowledge are implicitly elaborated 
in Being and Time (1927/1962). In What is Metaphysics? (1935/1993) Heidegger 
rehearses some of the themes of Being and Time but gives attention to what he calls 
the  “nothing” that lies beyond the attention of science or practical knowledge. This 
metaphysical analysis has implications for understanding the foundations of 
knowledge—its ontological conditions. This is a dimension of understanding—a 
dimension of knowledge also, of course—that is effectively foreclosed in dominant 
accounts of education, and in particular, in what passes for the philosophy of 
education. It is hardly surprising given that this dimension of knowledge necessarily 
addresses and foregrounds the “nothing” that attends knowledge. This nothing 
oddly doesn’t negate. On the contrary, it is its driving force.  
Such foreclosures—cutting out significant elements before they ever enter to 
trouble the scene—are necessary for educational knowledge as we know it. And for 
academic educational discourses.  
Just as philosophy of education has foreclosed any account of the fundamental 
ontological significance of the apparatuses of education, as though knowledge, 
learning and all the favoured  “concepts” for analysis in establishment philosophy 
of education could exist outside of the institutional technologies of education and 
could float in some ideal space that would be innocent of history and 
uncontaminated by the social forces and structures that frame them (Blake, 
Smeyers, Smith & Standish, 2002; Hirst and Peters, 1971; Peters, 1966; Pring, 
2000), so this collection seeks to get in touch with fundamental questions that attend 
education and that particularly attend the ontotheological privilege accorded to 
education in the institutionalized field of knowledge that is “philosophy of 
education.” Its starting point is a consideration of metaphysical questions activated 
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by a contemplation of the “nothing” that attends knowledge, thinking and being. 
This collection addresses education in terms of that nihilism.  
Heidegger offers a provocative opening into questions concerning the 
foundations of knowledge. Heidegger’s general project is to recover the thinking of 
Being that he claims has been lost to western metaphysics. This involves cultivating 
a concern for Being as such, independently of any specific domain of being or any 
specific entities (beings) (Heidegger, 1962). This gap between Being and beings is 
what Heidegger refers to as “the ontological difference.” The proper task of 
metaphysics—what metaphysics properly is, according to Heidegger—is to think 
this difference and pursue its implications. So Heidegger seeks to define what he 
means by metaphysics beyond the definitions it has been given in the tradition of 
western thought and philosophy (Heidegger, 1993). According to Heidegger, 
western metaphysics has characteristically closed down the question of Being. 
Ontology has been limited by onto-theology, the determination of Being by some 
overarching principle or idea.  
In both defining what metaphysics is and staking a claim for its proper 
significance, Heidegger’s argument moves against the idea that science alone—
concerned as it is with “beings”—can be the paradigm for knowledge, 
independently of metaphysics. Only metaphysics can provide the thinking necessary 
to renew the pursuit of truth that connects knowledge with Being, above and beyond 
amassing and classifying bits of knowledge and fragmenting them into 
specializations. Charged with this essential role, metaphysics comes up with some 
uncomfortable realizations. If specific sciences—or forms of knowledge—deal with 
particular realms of things, then beyond that specificity they are necessarily 
concerned with nothing. Absorbed with its own world of things, any science must 
then concern itself, beyond that world of specific things, with nothing. Rather 
oddly, perhaps, Heidegger interrogates this nothing to explore its significance. The 
argument asserts that metaphysics must concern itself with the nothing that science 
must not concern itself with and that yet defines what it is.  
This nothing, as it turns out, is both troubling and persistent. Although it may 
in effect be largely ignored—as nothing—yet it has an unavoidable tendency to 
make itself felt, not, of course, as a troubling presence, but more as a troubling 
absence. Concerned less that this line of questioning be seen as merely abstruse 
semantic play, Heidegger’s exploration of the question of the nothing goes on to 
examine the factors that exist beyond the particular, ostensible concerns of science 
or knowledge in its formal sense.  
It turns out that the nothing that relates to science is very much closer to home 
than this initial discussion might suggest. This nothing partakes of the general 
condition of existence: what is more this nothing belongs to the domain of meaning, 
oddly, perhaps. It actually has a strongly determining force in relation to that 
domain, a domain that cannot really be absent from almost any pursuit or any 
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activity, including, paradoxically, science, but also all forms of knowledge and 
understanding (Heidegger, 1993).  
Exploring the ontological conditions of knowledge, Heidegger claims that 
intellectual understanding is actually and necessarily predicated on forms of 
understanding that are not at all intellectual, that belong to what we can 
provisionally call moods,  “attunement” or  “being attuned” (“mood” is Heidegger’s 
translation of Aristotle’s terms “pathos”). Heidegger’s approach to ontology 
initially (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 71-77) goes through an account of  “Dasein” as the 
bearer of the question of Being so that no account of knowledge can bracket off the 
specific form of being that is  “the entity which we ourselves are” (Derrida, 1987, p. 
17).  
In order, partly, at least, to problematize the conventional notion of the human 
subject as a transcendental consciousness, Heidegger insists on keeping with the 
term Dasein. It is only via the specific being of Dasein—in its “thrownness” and 
with its worldly attachments, care and anxiety, that the question of Being can be 
posed at all. In the extensive analysis in Being and Time it emerges that Dasein is 
always in some kind of mood. The being or orientation to Being of Dasein is in fact 
structured by mood. For Heidegger the concept of mood used here is not to be 
understood as mere feeling, as transient emotion or superficial psychological state. 
Mood is fundamental in defining the way that Dasein experiences being in the 
world (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 172-178). Heidegger returns to the ontological 
significance of mood in his ruminations on nothing in What is Metaphysics? (1993).  
Heidegger asks is there a mood that corresponds to an understanding of the 
nothing beyond the limit of given knowledge:  “Does such an attunement in which 
man [sic] is brought before the nothing itself occur in human existence?” 
(Heidegger, 1993, p. 100). The answer that emerges is “anxiety.” Anxiety in this 
sense is not any specific anxiety about something in particular, that Heidegger 
categorizes as “fear,” but the “fundamental mood of anxiety” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 
100). This generalized anxiety may be likened to a persistent background noise that 
may only trouble us—consciously, at least—at certain times of solitude or 
alienation. It relates to what we might call the primordial nothing, the nothing of all 
things: and is intensified by the realization of the possibility of nothingness, non-
existence—or death. In spite of its necessary relation with nothing, this anxiety, 
however, is at the same time productive—giving rise to the productive world-
making activities of Dasein and ultimately to the question of Being.  
The “fundamental mood of anxiety” is the state “in which the nothing is 
revealed” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 101) and connects back with the analysis of the 
being of Dasein that Heidegger undertakes in Being and Time in relation to the fact 
of death. Dasein is characterized as “being-towards-death” (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 
299-311). Death is defined as: “an end beyond all completion, a limit beyond all 
limits” (Heidegger, 2000, 168); and as: “this uncanny thing” (Heidegger, 2000, 
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168); what’s more, there is “no way out in the face of death” (Heidegger, 2000, 
169).  
Interestingly this confrontation with the inescapable nothing occurs “not only 
when it is time to die but constantly and essentially” (Heidegger, 2000, 169): hence 
the term, “being-towards-death” as a way of defining Dasein ontologically. Just like 
the “nothing” that Heidegger identifies as the condition of Dasein’s knowledge, 
being-towards-death is identified as a fundamental condition of Dasein. What’s 
more, and crucially for the present account, the constant, generalized anxiety-
towards-death is experienced also metonymically, in all the possible and actual 
anxieties that might relate to everyday and experiential endings, nonbelongings and 
dissolutions but more interestingly, perhaps, in all commitments. It is as though 
commitment itself must be predicated on some kind of nothing.  
What does this do for our understanding of nihilism? For Heidegger, Dasein’s 
“thrownness” indicates the contingent, historically specific nature of understanding, 
knowing, acting. To use a different language, world and subject are necessary for 
one another but this encounter occurs entirely with what Catherine Malabou might 
refer to as an ontology of the accident (Malabou, 2009). Heidegger’s Dasein is 
always of the world, so too the world is of Dasein. The use of the term Dasein is, 
among other things, an attempt to avoid the category of the subject with its 
metaphysical potential for worldless abstraction. Dasein inhabits a world that is at 
the same time always a “Mitwelt” and is therefore always already engaged with 
others and with the things of its world which constitute the horizon of its being. 
Dasein is formed by the world it inhabits while also being attributed with world-
forming potential. Again, the element of contingency is important.  
The concept of world in Heidegger has far-reaching phenomenological 
implications. On a number of occasions, Heidegger explores the relations between 
world and things. In short, through the implications of the world-creating condition 
of Dasein, it emerges that the things of the world are not simply there in some inert 
and pre-given way. The things of the world—in their relations with Dasein—are the 
products of the contingency, anxiety and attendant care of Dasein. It is this “care” 
(“sorge”) that invests things with significance, imbues them with specific 
meanings—identity, in effect—and animates them within the context of an inherited 
but actively inhabited world. It is evident then that anxiety, the apprehension of the 
nothing and being-towards death are related components of  “uncanniness” that may 
at any time disturb the everyday consciousness of things; on the other hand they are 
the necessary pre-conditions for care and for the production of the world and the 
things of the world that characterize Dasein’s being.  
 
Nihilism and Deconstruction 
Nihilism, we might say, is the awareness of this disturbance and of the drive it gives 
rise to in a context where there is no external, guiding transcendental or 
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ontotheological principle to reach for. Heidegger’s “case” is illustrative of one way 
of understanding what nihilism is. For Heidegger the disavowal, in effect, of the 
“transcendental signified” and the repudiation of ontotheology implies neither loss 
of meaning, nor existential slump into inert indifference. On the contrary, we might 
say that a properly Heideggerian nihilism relates questions concerning meaning to 
the nothing that attends all things. Nihilism in Nietzsche’s view signalled a danger, 
a failure to meet the effective challenge of the implication of Zarathustra’s 
declaration that “God is dead!” (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 5). But Heidegger demonstrates 
that meaning and being-in-the-world necessarily consort with one another via the 
nothing—and without recourse to some idealized transformation into the trans-
human.  
Towards the end, Heidegger invites us to consider that western metaphysics, 
philosophy, may have run its course and that, without the props of ontotheology—
that deeply ingrained way of thinking that relies on some overarching principle: 
God, reason, progress, “man,” language …—thinking must struggle to find ways of 
engaging with the loss of enchantment that recognition of the nothing, or nihilism, 
may carry with it. A good deal of modern thought confronts this problem of the 
absence of the transcendental signified. A good deal of modern thought and 
institutional practice seeks rather to substitute one transcendental principle with 
another, or with a series of related, signifiers. Education offers a powerful example 
of the relatively recent emergence of an ontotheological principle that can offer both 
individual and social salvation in the face of the depredations of “technological 
enframing” or “instrumental rationality” (Heidegger, 1977; Weber, 1964).  
What nihilism is “ultimately” is contentious and problematic but somehow 
also essential: a condition, but not in and of itself a malaise, a fall or a catastrophe 
to be overcome. Nihilism certainly appears as a historical mode of being-in-the-
world and constitutes a significant dimension of the heritage of modernity. After 
Freud’s three blows to humanist narcissism, ontotheology could only survive as 
anachronism. The Copernican/Galilean revolutionary rethinking of the cosmos, the 
Darwinian account of evolution and the Freudian deconstruction of rationality had 
all had radically de-centering effects (Freud, 1977). Events of the twentieth century 
and a good deal of serious thinking in that period can only have served to 
exacerbate—or enhance—the sense that nihilism’s time has come. Faith in some 
transcendental figure, force or destiny cannot be sustained.  
Derrida’s affirmation of deconstruction, following, extending and reforming 
Heidegger’s thinking, may demonstrate what thinking might be after the recognition 
that the history of western metaphysics is the history of the determination of being-
as-presence that ends in nihilism of one kind or another (Derrida, 2001). Derrida 
points out, though, that several thinkers who undermined key aspects of 
ontotheology—Nietzsche and Freud for instance—could only do so by drawing on 
the resources of western metaphysics, turning the resources of rationality against 
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itself, as it were, enacting a torsion in the direction of thinking in order to 
undermine ontotheological dead-ends. What they achieve is a kind of permanent 
destabilization, a radical illustration that various  “theologically” inscribed concepts 
get put under erasure in various  “ways of thinking” in modernity:  
 
… Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, and especially of the concepts 
of Being and Truth, the Freudian critique of self-presence, a critique 
of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity, and of the self-
proximity or self-possession, and more radically…the Heideggerean 
destruction of metaphysics, of the determination of Being as Presence 
(Derrida, 2001, p. 54).  
 
Such ontotheological principles cannot provide the centering, controlling force for a 
structural totality either of reality or of our understanding of it. In ‘Structure, Sign 
and Play’ (2001), Derrida writes of a movement from “God” to “Man” to  
“language” where these ideas stand in succession as dominant organizing principles 
(for understanding the question of Being, in Heidegger’s terms). It turns out that the 
last of these, language, as a decentred structure exemplifies possibility for the 
turning of the heritage of western metaphysics against itself.  
Language, in effect, Derrida demonstrates for the rest of his varied writing 
career, cannot be a stabilizing or centring principle. As a metonymy for being it 
illustrates a radical indeterminacy and an endless deferral—of meaning, of 
presence, of finality of any kind—structured always by the simplest principle of 
absence, “spacing.” Nihilism—in so far as it may signify an absent centre or a 
reminder that all presence must also be constituted by absence (nothing)—is 
perhaps an inevitable consequence of this movement. Language cannot serve an 
ontotheological function: it is itself characterized by “spacing,” the necessary 
intrusion of “nothing” that enables difference to be the only structuring principle 
that can hold—and cannot hold—the whole together (Derrida, 1976). In this 
movement of thought Derrida explores the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and by a 
perfectly happy contingency—in an argument that suggests that a certain 
contingency alone is sovereign (in scare quotes)—engages with the distinction in La 
Pensee Sauvage between engineer and bricoleur. It turns out that the engineer in the 
movement of this particular deconstructive move will have to be rethought as 
nothing more than another kind of bricoleur—that is a maker who is defined by 
having to rely on what’s ready-to-hand for materials and for principles of 
construction. Such “objects” of construction that arise, including all big ideas about 
Being, can only be produced retrospectively, as their origin, necessarily obscure and 
contingent, can only be understood as the product of accident, or  thrownness. This 
distinction stands then for what is meant by deconstruction—the recognition that 
the hand of the bricoleur is at work in the construction of the most elaborate and 
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rational systems—of thinking or of practice. There is, then, according to the logic of 
deconstruction, a radical contingency in the order of things that echoes the 
elaboration of fundamental ontology articulated in Being and Time.  
The absence of a centre, the absence that attends presence, the spacing of 
language, the disappearance of the transcendental signified (God or similar) are all 
characterized by a certain nothing. At the same time they are in each case indicative 
of a certain condition of freedom, or “play,” within any structure or system 
(Derrida, 2001). This Derridean insight can be essential to the exploration of 
nihilism. It provides, paradoxically, perhaps, the very possibility of an ethics that is 
not rooted in morality.  
 
These Papers 
Papers in this collection put into question the grounds for contemporary faith in 
education. They touch upon and explore dimensions of nihilism in relation to the 
world of education that forecloses any trace of nihilism from its terrain and from its 
thinking.  
Aislinn O Donnell’s paper hovers between recognition of the force of “the 
nothing” and the realization that while this nothing deprives us of intrinsic meaning 
and final purpose that is not the end of the story: accepting, embracing radical 
contingency might offer a perhaps muted but hard-won and more realistically 
attuned affirmation of a possible possibility rooted in self-generated recognition of 
“the nihil.” The alternative to the transcendental offered in this case is modest, 
warm and genial and is certainly original. A kind of nihilism that recognizes the 
provenance of failure and pain may enable us to grasp what is most essential about 
our mitsein in terms of recognizing and belonging to one another as opposed to the 
often hollow promises and alienating effects of fulfilment through the endless 
labour of individual and collective self-improvement promoted by the educational 
language of aspiration and performance. Here a kind of nihilism modestly proposes 
an anti-heroic ethic and envisions the possibility of an anti-heroic pedagogy in a 
move towards a politics of decency.  
For Ansgar Allen nihilism is embodied and embedded in the western heritage 
that is sustained in the essential ethic of education. Education has become attached 
to an expression of a certain western will to mastery—as an all absorbing maw that 
defines not only what we are but what we might aspire to be. An education attached 
to enlightenment ideals that has patently failed in its own mission now defines all 
who fall within its determining sphere as falling short of the ideal it has itself failed 
to realize. Education colluded with the idea of mastery inherent in “reason” as 
ontotheological principle and this is our dispirited heritage. The dark alter ego of 
education, the shadow figure of the pursuit of mastery, turns out to be the 
impossible Sade, whose repulsive spectre holds out mastery or failure as the 
misbegotten opposition that holds the dominant metaphysic of our time together. 
Special Issue Introduction: The Time for Nihilism 
10 
Many live within its sickening see-saw logic, so that a vital question for the 
educator is: How to live with the institutionalized nihilism, how not to succumb to 
the pleasures of despair? Allen suggests that there is no way out for us, certainly not 
the false ideals of redemption. There is only perhaps a way down, a “downgoing” in 
fact—whatever that may mean—to find another way of being within a nihilism we 
have, historically speaking, collectively, albeit unconsciously, unwittingly created.  
Roy Goddard explores the logic and imputations of Ray Brassier’s exploration 
of nihilism regarded as a speculative opportunity in an extended paper that offers a 
useful introduction to a complex contemporary text. Brassier’s positions are 
explored in terms of their bases but Roy’s explication also considers some of the 
serious questions that attend them. Some implications for education are also 
explored. This chapter provides a powerful introduction to some serious 
contemporary philosophy but also considers, against the grain of all hegemonic 
philosophy of education, the possible relations between philosophy at the cutting 
edge and education with an ontological emphasis. Brassier’s philosophy, as 
Goddard outlines it, is challenging to all the humanist assumptions that attend 
education as we know it with its deeply humanist ethic and its modernist addiction 
to the government of “souls.” 
Nick Peim’s paper considers that deconstruction, in effect, does thinking 
differently and offers a challenge to the history of philosophy, understood as a 
rationally developmental practice, in relation to the domain of tragedy considered as 
a complementary form of deconstruction. Drawing heavily of The Birth of Tragedy 
this paper considers that tragedy, like deconstruction, offers a take on the world that 
eschews ultimate, ontotheological groundings. It is at home in the realm of aporia. It 
affords space for a thinking that revisits some of the most cherished assumptions 
about both philosophy and education of our time and context. Some of the 
excitement conveyed in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy might be recaptured including 
the apparently daring, or at least rare, possibility of thinking beyond education 
rather than attempting to redeem education. The encounter with nihilism is here felt 
to be bracing (Nietzsche, 1956).  
Harriett Pattison’s paper, focusing on the troubling topic of time, subjects 
education to a strong dose of nihilism as a way of thinking outside of, beyond, or at 
least differently from, its own all-encompassing metaphysical order. The key to this 
is an understanding of education’s projection of temporality where the fulfilment of 
time is seen in terms of the realization of narrowly conceived educational goals. 
Such conceptions of time, for Pattison, have an ontotheological cast: they project a 
vision of how the world should be and how your place in the world should be. 
Nietzsche provides an alternative possibility for the rethinking of our relations to 
time outside of the dominant temporal regime of education. 
Frances Atherton looks at nihilism through another perspective, from an 
attempt to communicate the grain of the life of homeless destitution. Here nihilism 
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is conceived of as lived experience. Among the dispossessed, nihilism takes the 
form of a way of life. Those whom Kristeva might have identified as “abject” 
disturb our image of ourselves. In this world, the standard model of education as 
self-improvement or as social redemption is rendered absurd. Atherton’s paper 
doesn’t dwell on abstract conceptions of nihilism but finds here, among the 
homeless, paradoxically, perhaps, that the brutal “education” of the world of the 
homeless gives rise to a more desentimentalized realization of the Nietzschean ideal 
of self-fashioning creativity than those more cheerful, educationally hegemonic 
accounts of “human flourishing” could ever achieve. It is a powerful occasion for 
thinking alternatively: for thinking beyond the constraints of the normativity of 
accomplishment and achievement.  
Similarly, perhaps, Paul Moran presents the difficult, instructive case of a 
“looked after child” to rethink the privileged ethic of education. Here the systems of 
meaning and identity that strongly characterize the world of education and 
effectively shape the social are represented as metaphysically produced and 
reproduced within the institutions’ (of education) habitual practices, rather than 
belonging to the natural order of things or being ordained by pure reason. Lest we 
think too easily that nihilism blithely offers a positive occasion for creative self-
fashioning we are reminded of the strictures of the symbolic order, its subtle 
apparatuses and its strongly ingrained states of mind that sustain quite dramatic 
forms of exclusion while operating in the name of other, more comforting 
metaphysical principles. Moran considers Nietzsche’s “death of God” in at least two 
ways: one as turning point in thinking; another as a revelation that things are not as 
they are due to some God given providence or necessity. The educational world-
symbolic-order decrees normative being to exclude or delimit the being of those—
the refugee, the dispossessed, the looked after child—who are abjected. The 
troubling case presented here through this abject figure renders the nature of things 
educational troubled and troubling in a far reaching way.  
 
Education: The Future of an Illusion  
The papers here lead into a consideration of another perspective on nihilism, one 
offered by Bernard Stiegler (b. 1952). Stiegler provides a description of modernity 
that puts faith and fidelity at the centre. But for Stiegler both are understood 
essentially from a social perspective. This perspective encourages us to reconsider 
some of the most enduring and powerful ideas that are offered in an attempt to bind 
together an experience of the world that is fractured by differences and crises of 
faith. The papers in this collection tend to put into question our collective faith in 
education, not in order to promote a universal faithlessness but to re-examine the 
ontotheological commitment to an apparatus that seems, in so many ways, to do the 
opposite of what it promises or at least to contradict its mythical mission. If the 
privileged status of education derives from a discredited vision, it warrants 
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rethinking: not to redeem it from its fallen self; not to reform it into an improved 
version. The challenge is to put into question the privileged status of education as 
idea, as apparatus and as global social project.  
For Stiegler, who closely follows, extends and develops Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, society can be understood as “an apparatus for the 
production of fidelity” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 59). Stiegler notes, following Weber, that 
in the modern era capitalism transformed fidelity. In modern societies “trust 
understood as fiduciary calculability” became the order of the day; the crisis of 
2007-2008 turned what credit was left in this “fiduciary” faith into discredit, giving 
rise to a new form of “disbelief”—a condition of social nihilism .  
Our era experiences the “disenchantment brought about by rationalization” in 
more intense form (Stiegler, 2013, p. 59). For Stiegler, for whom human life is 
always strongly characterized by a “prosthetic ontology,” the apparatuses of 
meaning-making have a strong bearing on questions of fidelity, belief and faith. We 
experience the world to a significant degree through such means in so far as we 
experience life as “worth living.” According to Stiegler, contemporary loss of faith 
correlates with a long process stemming from the renaissance “reading revolution.” 
For Stiegler the real meaning of the renaissance is in a transformation of prosthetic 
memory via the printing press and access to “grammatization” that leads into 
modernity and beyond. This process is recently enhanced, transfigured by the 
digital revolution that produces an extension to the world of literature: producing 
“an internet of things,” the “hypermaterial structure” of the contemporary life-world 
(Stiegler, 2013, p. 59-60).  
Following Heidegger, Stiegler notes that the rise of rationality occurs not only 
in the register of reason but also and significantly in the register of calculation that 
comes to stand as a prosthetic extension of what reason is. Through both reason and 
rational calculation, “Divine logos” becomes subject to secular reading (law is 
mystical but text is everyday) and this in turn concurs with the process whereby, 
according to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, “the suprasensible” is put into 
question. Stiegler points out that Nietzsche knew that his declaration of the death of 
God was premature and that its meaning was “to come.” For Nietzsche it would be 
a long time before “those who murdered God would be capable of comprehending 
their gesture”:  “I have come too early...This tremendous event is still on its way, 
still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 61). Is not 
now an apt time for the encounter with nihilism? 
Oddly, perhaps, Stiegler’s nihilism arises from the analysis of “prosthetic 
ontology,” and the role of the thing as a central figure in his account of things. 
Taking a Lacanian-Althusserian position, Stiegler reminds us that relations with 
things are always freighted with meaning, loaded with desire. Things populate our 
world(s) not as neutral debris that just happens to be lying around nor as pure 
functional tools that we can put to use to serve other, thing-less purposes, but rather 
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as expressions of a symbolically rendered imaginary relation to the world that also 
binds us to one another. The primordial “thing” or object of attachment and desire is 
cathected onto things: the world is shaped and ordered by things in this sense. 
Things have world-forming functions and express an aura of the absolute other. At 
the same time at the heart of “the thing” there is an essential nothing without this 
aura of attachment that is not a property of the “thing itself.”  
The thing of desire is the impossible (although essential) object: a kind of 
nothing that is at the same time “the a priori of desire…” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 61). 
This idea of the thing and things in general as both fundamental (“what makes life 
worth living”) to the milieu or medium for “relations of fidelity “ (Stiegler, 2013, p. 
62) and as existentially and essentially empty is partly drawn from Jean 
Baudrillard’s  “system of objects” and partly drawn from Derrida’s logic of the  
“pharmakon” (Derrida, 1981). The very constitution of a specific world and mitsein 
is characterized by a collective relation to things that operate as transitional objects 
in the Winnicott sense: things exist in the form of a tie or seal within a system of 
supportive entities that holds the world together (Winnicott, 1953). Such things 
accrue value within the realm of symbolic exchange and mutuality. They are 
otherwise devoid of content or empty characterized by a necessary nothing. In this 
sense, again, nihilism is essential.  
For Stiegler, one serious problem is that under capitalism the aura of things 
shifts as things become increasingly disposable, even structurally obsolescent. Their 
symbolic value becomes more transitory and uncertain to a radically different 
degree. Hannah Arendt had foreseen that this “systematic infidelity” destroys “the 
sustainability of the world.” This description of the present order of things—where  
“everything solid melts into air”—strikes a chord with Jean-Francois Lyotard’s law 
of adaptation that holds under the postmodern condition, as well as with Zygmunt 
Bauman’s condition of  “liquid modernity” (Arendt, 1958,; Marx & Engels, 2008; 
Bauman, 2000; Lyotard, 1986). Liquid selves living in a world of liquid fear where 
the basic unit of the social bond is hollowed out and the ultimate, nightmare 
scenario is made of “consumers without object.” Stiegler’s account of things is 
predicated on a historical sense of radical shifts between orders of techne towards 
the present, digital order populated by “internauts” who occupy, engage with, 
exchange and find meaning in an “internet of things” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 63).  
Stiegler’s argument is couched in terms of crisis: as though the present 
condition or the condition of the present represents a historically new condition of 
loss. It is lapsarian: it projects back, by implication, at least, to a time of more finely 
attuned relation between human and techne encapsulated in the rather romantic 
image of the “…sealhunter who carves his harpoon” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 84). 
Accordingly, Stiegler’s account of contemporary global conditions is organized 
around the idea of salvation based on the metaphor of healing, referring to a 
“pharmacology of the spirit” and “a pharmacology of symbolic relations” meaning, 
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effectively, a return to a prior relation to the world through the things of human 
production (Stiegler, 2013).  
But is it necessary to represent the sense of crisis in our time as the expression 
of lapsarian thinking? Crisis expressed in terms of loss of meaning is a common 
theme that has engaged a great deal of would-be ontological thinking. Stiegler is 
one among many—Weber, Heidegger, Marcuse, Adorno, Derrida, Bauman, and 
others—who have updated Freud’s discontented civilization through an account of 
the present condition (Weber, 1957; Heidegger, 1977; Marcuse, 1964; Adorno, 
1990; Derrida & Roudinescou, 2004; Bauman, 2000).  
After the death of God, after the discovery of the unconscious and the formless 
“thing” it harbours, after the various crises of modernity—including Derrida’s 
“twelve plagues” but also the general loss of meaning that comes with the end of 
grand narratives, the awareness of radical finitude, the acknowledgement of solar 
death to come and the perhaps humbling recognition of a necessary turn to 
animality: after all of these apparent falls, is it not possible, following Nietzsche’s 
mood, to affirm nihilism as essential rather than to wish for the recovery of 
something that was always already predicated on some nothing. That nothing might 
be the possibility that philosophy or metaphysics or thinking can survive 
ontotheology and can—as deconstruction has demonstrated—rethink the grounds 
for politics and ethics.  
 
These papers offer modest proposals for the above.  
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